Therefore is was no brilliant task to intimidate batsman, and ergo their reputation is bigger than it should be.
There wasn't much more to leg theory than "bowling bumpers".
Stack seven guys on the leg side, get quick bowlers to bowl directly at the body of the batsman, wait for the largely unprotected batsman to either defend his body (making a close catch likely), get hit, or try to play a shot to score that will sooner rather than later see him caught on the boundary or off a top edge.
gibbs, or any other west indian spinner for that matter, has absolutely no business being anywhere near the ATG team.
and i am not sure if there is much, if anything, between desmond haynes and chris gayle. if anything, the latter's got a broader set of skills.
with that in mind, my team'd be
the teams got the spinning reserves to deal with an anomalous dust-bowl.
and hayden is criminally under-rated here.
Viv's perceived weakness as a captain was his lack of patience and agressive attitude towards his own players. Nothing to do with being a one dimensional stategist.
The gentleman never lost a test series as captain, and this includes the loss of his own form and the retirement of many of the players from Lloyds era.
Conrad Hunte / Frank Worrell *
George Headley *
Clyde Walcott +
Lance Gibbs / Joel Garner (pitch dependent)
I grew up watching Viv as captain, I knew what kind of captain he was, with regard to body line I am willing to hear what you have to say.
A touring English side, managed to overcome a far superior Australian side via this incredible tactic. Whatever anyone says, they played within the laws of cricket, and the indisputably greatest batsman in history was humbled (albeit still averaging ~55), resulting in a series win massively against the odds.
As far as English victories go, it's up there with '66 and Agincourt. :ph34r:
I what it accomplished, what Jager is saying is that it was more that just short bowling aimed at the body with a predominantly leg side field with the intention of hurting the batsmen or getting them to play the ball to leg in the air.
In 1928/29 England, with Jardine a junior member of the side, won the Ashes 4-1 - the pitches were perfect for batting, prepared for timeless Tests, and the going only got tough if it rained and the wicket turned sticky
In 1930 Bradman changed the natural order of things - Jardine and England believed on 1928/29 pitches, which they had every reason to expect again, that they simply would not be able to get him out.
Fast leg theory was designed to stop Bradman in particular but the Aussies in general, from scoring as many runs so quickly - the idea was if you bowled fast, short and to the leg side and packed the leg field then the batsman either couldn't play a shot at all (and therefore didn't score), backed away to leg to try and force through the vacant off side and thereby take a big risk, or take an equally big risk by scoring runs through the areas where all but one of the fielders were.
No one set out to hurt the Australians - that they got hurt was because in fact the bounce on the wickets, unlike 28/29, tended to be uneven so they couldn't be sure the short delivery wouldn't stay low and hit the stumps, so the slow footed ones like Ponsford, Woodfull and Fingleton preferred to get hit rather than risk being bowled or lbw to one that kept low
Bradman tried the off-side route with some success - he only got hit once in the series, by Larwood on his backside
McCabe tried the leg side route with one spectacular success, his famous knock where he flayed Larwood and Voce and nearly killed the tactic, but he did little after that
There was another way for a Test class batsman to play it - stop whining, stand up straight, get in line and wait till the bowlers tire themselves out - the Aussies didn't try that - but Jardine demonstrated how to do it against Constantine and Martindale at Old Trafford in 1933